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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DUE PROCESS: TOWARDS MORE
EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT-UTILIZATION OF
COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE TO SUSTAIN A REASONABLE
SUSPICION INQUIRY
State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
On June 22, 1992, Officer James Chase [hereinafter Officer Chase]
of the Bismarck Police Department received a radio message issued by
police dispatch detailing a potential drunk driver in the drive-up lane of
a Wendy's Restaurant.I The bulletin consisted of a description of the
vehicle including color, the license plate number, and the vehicle's
position in the drive-up lane. 2 Additionally, the bulletin included the
statement of the informant, indicating that "[tihe driver could barely
hold his head up," which created the basis for the informant's belief that
the driver of the vehicle was intoxicated. 3 Acting upon the report,
Officer Chase arrived at Wendy's within minutes.4 Upon arrival, Officer
Chase noticed a vehicle matching that described in the bulletin leaving
Wendy's parking lot.5 Officer Chase followed the vehicle but did not
notice anything unusual or suspicious about the operation of the vehi-
cle. 6 Subsequently, the vehicle turned back into Wendy's lot and
parked.7 Officer Chase was then able to confirm the license plate
number of the vehicle as reported by the dispatcher.8
Officer Chase pulled in behind the vehicle and turned on his
warning flashers. 9 Officer Chase then approached the vehicle and
requested that the driver, Rodney Miller [hereinafter Miller], perform
field sobriety tests. 10 As a result of his poor performance on the sobriety
tests, Miller was arrested and charged under section 39-08-01(1)(a) and
(b) of the North Dakota Century Code, which prohibits driving or being
1. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638,639 (N.D. 1994).
2. Id.
3. Id. Further, the informant identified himself to the dispatcher as "Jody with Wendy's." Id.
However, the identity of the informant nor his employment with Wendy's was ever revealed to
Officer Chase by the dispatcher. Id. Although both the informant and the police dispatcher identified
the color of the pickup as red, it was in fact orange. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 639.
7. Id. After leaving the parking lot, the pickup drove east on Capitol Avenue, then north on the
frontage road in front of Wendy's at about five to seven miles per hour, then turned back into the
parking lot. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. When an officer makes a display of authority to bring about the stop of a moving vehicle,
this constitutes a seizure. State v. Langseth, 492 N.W.2d 298, 300 (N.D. 1992).
10. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 639.
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in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 1' Miller
moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop on the
basis that Officer Chase did not have a reasonable and articulable suspi-
cion to stop the vehicle. 12 The trial court denied the motion to suppress,
stating that "the information available to Officer Chase at the time of the
stop was sufficient to support a reasonable and articulable suspicion." 13
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that Officer Chase
did not have an articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle
because the knowledge of the dispatcher could not be imputed to Officer
Chase.14 According to the court, the combination of the anonymous tip
and observation of innocent facts by Officer Chase was insufficient to
11. Id. Section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
1. A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a
highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for
vehicular use in this state if any of the following apply:
a. That person has a blood alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of one
percent by weight at the time of the performance of a chemical test within two hours
after the driving.
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
c. That person is under the influence of any drug or substance or combination of drugs or
substances to a degree which renders that person incapable of safely driving.
d. That person is under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drugs or
substances to a degree which renders that person incapable of safely driving.
The fact that any person charged with violating this section is or has been legally
entitled to use alcohol or other drugs or substances is not a defense against any charge
for violating this section, unless a drug which predominately caused impairment was used
only as directed or cautioned by a practitioner who legally prescribed or dispensed the
drug to that person.
N.D. CENT. COoE § 39-08-01 (1987 & Supp. 1993). The court summarized the importance of the
"actual physical control" offense in State v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1976). In Schuler, the
court reiterated that this offense was "intended to enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before
he strikes." Id. at 370 (quoting Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975)). The
court concluded by emphasizing that a drunken driver behind the wheel of a moving automobile posed
a serious threat to the public safety and welfare. Id. (quoting Hughes, 535 P.2d at 1024).
12. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 639.
13. Id. at 640. On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that substantial deference
should be given to the trial court's "superior opportunity to weigh the evidence and to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." Id. See also State v. Guthmiller, 499 N.W.2d 590, 592 (N.D. 1993)
(stating that a trial court's determination to suppress evidence will be affirmed if there is sufficient
competent evidence for the decision). Additionally, conflicts in evidence should be resolved in favor
of affirming a trial court's decision on a suppression motion. Id.
14. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 645. By refusing to allow imputation of the knowledge of the
dispatcher to Officer Chase, the court classified the tip as anonymous for purposes of a reasonable
suspicion inquiry. Id. at 644.
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establish the reasonable and articulable suspicion needed to stop the
car.
15
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
police from performing unreasonable searches and seizures. 16 Anytime
an officer confronts an individual thereby restricting his or her ability to
leave, the officer has "seized" that person within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment,17 regardless of whether or not an actual arrest
results.18 Ideally, a police officer will attempt to obtain a judicially-
15. Id. at 645. Adhering to the totality-of-the-circumstances approach developed in United
States v. Cortez and later defined in Illinois v. Gates, the North Dakota Supreme Court categorized tips
from informants as either anonymous or face-to-face in order to determine the reliability of the tip.
Id. at 640-42. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981) (stating that the totality of the
circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into account, and then, on that basis, determining
whether the investigating officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the accused
of criminal activity); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (stating that under the totality of the
circumstances test, the veracity, reliability and knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information
are factored into the probable cause inquiry). Accord Geiger v. Backes, 444 N.W.2d 692, 693 (N.D.
1989) (indicating that driving a vehicle slowly, in the early morning hours, through an area where
numerous thefts had occurred, justified stopping the vehicle). Factors considered in this approach are
the "quantity, or content, and quality, or degree of reliability, of the information available to the
officer." State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640 (N.D. 1994). An anonymous tip is considered less
reliable than a face-to-face tip, thereby requiring a greater quantity of verifiable information to raise
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 642. Also, corroboration of information easily obtainable by the public
does not increase the reliability of an anonymous tip. Id. Notwithstanding, a tip with a relatively low
degree of reliability can establish reasonable suspicion if the tip contains sufficient information to
counteract the lack of reliability. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (stating that an
anonymous tip must retain sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop). The officer
must corroborate the tip by observing some conduct or behavior on the part of the driver indicating an
illegal activity or impaired condition. Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d
329, 331 (ND. 1987) (citing State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D. 1985)).
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (emphasis added). Terry involved a warrantless "stop
and frisk" initiated by a patrol officer after observing the accused engaged in a pattern of suspicious
conduct. Id. at 5-7. The ensuing frisk revealed Terry to be carrying a concealed weapon, for which
he was charged. Id. at 7. Terry moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the guns had been
seized following an illegal search. Id. The Supreme Court stated that "a perfectly reasonable
apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information tojustify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime." Id. at 26-27.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id. The Fourth Amendment applies to only those searches and seizures that are the product
of government action. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (stating that constitutional
guarantees from unreasonable searches and seizures only apply to government action and not private
individuals).
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authorized search warrant prior to the actual search and seizure. 19
Compliance with this procedure mandates that the requesting officer
produce evidence sufficient to establish probable cause before the
presiding judicial officer can issue a warrant. 20 Several situations can
excuse the failure to comply with the warrant requirement.2 1 One such
"narrowly-drawn" exception was established by the United States
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.22 In Terry, the United States Supreme
Court created a limited exception to the general Fourth Amendment
requirement that all seizures by government personnel be justified by
probable cause to arrest for a crime.23
The Terry Court recognized that a police officer may, in limited
circumstances, approach a person to investigate potential criminal
activity even though there is no probable cause to make a formal ar-
rest.24 The Court distinguished an "investigative stop," such as the one
in Miller, from an actual "arrest." 25 Specifically, the Court stated that
an "investigative stop" amounted to only a "brief .. . intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person," 26 and that this brief, minimal intrusion
constituted an entirely different type of intrusion upon individual
19. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Whenever possible, the police must resort to the warrant procedure to
obtain advance judicial approval prior to the search. Id. Affidavits in support of the search warrant
should be tested in a "commonsense and realistic" fashion, and not in a "hypertechnical" manner.
State v. Klosterman, 317 N.W.2d 796, 801 (N.D. 1982). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213. 238
(1983) (stating that the "task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances ...there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place").
20. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.
21. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include:
"investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizure of items in
plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches, searches of containers, inventory searches,
border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special needs of
law enforcement make the probable cause requirement impracticable." Twenty-Second Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-1992. Part 1
of 4., 81 GEO. L. J. 853, 877 (1993) [hereinafter Court Review] (interpreting the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizures through examples of the exceptions to the
probable cause and warrant requirements, including an analysis and development of the reasonable
suspicion exception, as addressed by the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court from 1991-1992).
See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (lending support to the contention that the
requirement of a judicially-approved search warrant can be excused in relatively few instances).
22. 392 U.S. 1,30 (1968).
23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See also United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411,417
(7th Cir. 1985) (asserting that "Terry creates an exception not to the warrant requirement, but to the
probable cause requirement.").
24. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
25. Id. at 26.
26. id. The Court stated that an arrest formed the initial stage of a criminal prosecution intended
to "vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed." Id. at 26. Further, an arrest was inevitably
followed by "future interference with the individual's freedom of movement," whether or not a
conviction results. Id. An investigative stop does not necessarily lead to criminal prosecution. Id.
Freedom from invasions of personal security does not equate with vindication of societal interests. Id.
at 27.
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freedom than an intrusion pursuant to an actual formal arrest. 27 There-
fore, an investigative stop could be properly imposed because of the
greater interests in crime prevention and detection on the basis of a
police officer's suspicion.28
Since stopping an individual to investigate does not equate to a
formal arrest, the evidence required to make an investigative stop within
the Fourth Amendment is less than that needed to establish probable
cause for an arrest.29 To constitute a valid investigatory stop, the stop
need only be reasonable in scope and conducted for a legitimate investi-
gatory purpose.30 Consequently, a police officer may stop a person and
detain him for questioning provided that the officer has a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to com-
mit a crime.3 1 However, the officer must be able to articulate specific
27. Id. at 26. Terry defined "a special category of Fourth Amendment 'seizures' so substantially
less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment
'seizures' reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test." United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
236 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979)).
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
29. Id. at 26. See also id. at II n.5 (quoting from People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32 (N.Y. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965)); Court Review, supra note 21, at 862 n.47 (listing examples of cases
in which reasonable suspicion investigations were upheld because of this lower requirement); Borman
v. Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757, 761 (N.D. 1969) (quoting with approval from State v. Carpenter, 150
N.W.2d 129. 133 (Neb. 1967)).
30. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has found that the factual basis
necessary to sustain a "routine traffic check" is minimal. Marben v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 294
N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980) (finding that a report of a drunk driver tailgating for 60 miles by a
trucker passing a patrol officer on a highway constituted specific and articulable facts sufficient to
support an investigatory stop). Further, upon review of reasonable suspicion investigative stops, this
same court was of the opinion that an actual violation of the motor vehicle and traffic safety laws need
not even occur to initiate a stop. Id.
31. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. See also Neset v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 388 N.W.2d
860, 862 (N.D. 1986) (stating that an investigating officer's observation of a vehicle weaving within its
own lane justified a stop of the vehicle); State v. Placek, 386 N.W.2d 36, 37 (N.D. 1986) (providing
that "[a]n officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating the law
in order to make a legal investigative stop" (citations omitted)). To conduct a warrantless arrest or to
obtain an arrest warrant, the police must establish probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964). Probable cause "exists when police have knowledge of information of facts and circumstanc-
es sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a person of reasonable caution that an offense has
been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Court Review, supra note 21, at 859 (citing
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). Probable cause may be based on hearsay from a reliable
source, information from an anonymous informant, personal observations of the officer, or the special
training, experience, and expertise of the officer. Id. at 860-61.
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facts which, taken together with any rational inferences from those facts,
could reasonably warrant the interference.32
The limited holding of Terry was subsequently expanded by the
United States Supreme Court in Adams v. Williams.33 The Adams Court
stated that the factual basis necessary to establish reasonable suspicion to
make a stop may arise from information furnished by another person
and need not rest solely on the officer's personal observations. 34
However, the Court stated that if an officer relies on information from an
identifiable informant, the informant's tip must display sufficient
"indicia of reliability" to justify the stop. 35 In Adams, the Court
stressed that since the informant came forward personally and provided
information which was immediately verifiable at the scene, the informa-
tion was more reliable than that provided by an anonymous telephone
tip. 36 Thus, the Adams Court concluded that this immediately verifiable
32. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court determined that there is no
readily available test to determine the reasonableness of an investigatory stop other than to balance the
need to search against the invasion which accompanies it. Id. (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)). An investigatory stop is reasonable when the facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge, combined with those to which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a crime
was being committed. Id. at 22. While the veracity and reliability of information supplied by an
informant varies, it is nonetheless included in this determination. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
147 (1972). Consequently, the personal knowledge of the investigating officer, as well as information
provided by an informant, are necessary considerations in any reasonable suspicion inquiry. Id.
33. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Adams, the officer, acting on a tip from a known informant,
approached a parked car and asked the driver [hereinafter respondent] to open the car door. Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972). When the respondent lowered the window, the officer reached
into the car through the open window and seized a handgun located in the respondent's waistband,
exactly where the informant had said it would be. Id. Respondent was arrested for unlawful
possession of a handgun. Id. A search incident to the arrest revealed that the respondent was also in
possession of heroin, also as the informant had reported. Id. The Second Circuit found that the
evidence used in the trial had been obtained as a result of an unlawful search. Id. at 144. See also
Orrin S. Shifrin, Supreme Court Review: Fourth Amendment-Protection Against Unreasonable
Search and Seizure: The Inadequacies of Using an Anonymous Tip to Provide Reasonable Suspicion
for an Investigatory Stop: Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), 81 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMiNOLOGY 760,
760 (1991) (analyzing the utilization of information provided by an anonymous tip to establish that
reasonable suspicion is inadequate to protect the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures).
34. Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143,147 (1972). In Adams, the Court stated:
In reaching this conclusion, we reject respondent's argument that reasonable cause for a
stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's personal observation, rather than on in-
formation supplied by another person. Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence
coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One
simple rule will not cover every situation.
Id. See, e.g., Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D. 1987)
(stating that the factual basis needed for the stop need not be based on the officer's personal
observations alone, but could be formed from information furnished by other persons).
35. Adams,407 U.S. at 147.
36. Id. at 146.
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information, coupled with the known identity of the informant, was
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. 37
Generally, the quality of the information supplied by an identified
informant is enough so that the quantity of the information contained in
the tip alone is sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion. 38 Regardless of
the identity of the informant, however, anonymous informants can
supply sufficiently reliable information to establish reasonable suspicion
to make an investigatory stop. 39 Although generally considered less
reliable than tips from identified informants, the reliability of a tip from
an unidentified informant can also be established by verification of the
information by the investigating officer.40 If an investigating officer is
able to verify the information contained in the tip from the unidentified
informant, the reliability of the tip increases. Thus, proper verification
of information contained in the tip by the investigating officer will
provide sufficient indicia of reliability to establish reasonable suspi-
cion. 41
Information from an informant need not always be given directly to
the investigating officer to be considered sufficiently reliable. Generally,
police dispatchers receive this information and, in turn, relay this infor-
mation to patrol officers to investigate these reports of criminal activity.
While the information contained in the dispatch message may be readily
verifiable, the investigating officer himself need not be aware of the
specific facts which prompted the bulletin.42 The strength of the bulletin
itself is often sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.43
37. Id. at 146-47.
38. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (stating that "if a tip has a relatively low
degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion
than would be required if the tip were more reliable.").
39. Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329,332 (N.D. 1987).
40. See id. (finding that upon the corroboration of other details contained in the anonymous tip,
the investigating officer then had sufficient information for a reasonable suspicion); State v.
Thoradson, 440 N.W.2d 510,512 (N.D. 1989) (finding that the information provided by an anonymous
informant was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion when verified by the investigating officer).
41. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147. The Adams Court stated that the tip provided sufficient indicia of
reliability because the informant was known to the police officer, had provided him information in the
past, the information was immediately verifiable at the scene, and the informant himself would have
been subject to arrest for making a false complaint under state law had the information proven
incorrect. Id. at 146-47.
42. See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560,568 (1971) (stating that
arresting officers are entitled to rely upon requesting officers information).
43. See State v. Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600, 602 (N.D. 1992) (stating that other persons or officers
may supply information to establish reasonable suspicion).
1995] 803
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Accordingly, in Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary44
the United States Supreme Court stated that the collective knowledge of
all law enforcement personnel, including that known by or transmitted to
the stopping officer, must be taken into consideration. 45 The Whiteley
Court confirmed that an officer may rely on a police radio bulletin to
effectuate an arrest absent personal knowledge of information sufficient
to establish probable cause. 4 6 However, the arrest's legality and the
admissibility of any evidence discovered incident to that arrest depends
on whether the officer who issued the bulletin possessed probable cause
to make the initial arrest.47
The Whiteley collective knowledge proposition was subsequently
expanded by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Hensley.48 In Hensley, the Court extended this premise from a primarily
"probable cause" setting into the context of a "reasonable and arti-
culable suspicion" analysis, undertaken as the result of an investigatory
stop.49 The Hensley Court found no distinction between a report that
probable cause had been established and a bulletin which was issued
44. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). In Whiteley, a patrol officer initiated a warrantless arrest of two
suspected robbers in reliance on a radio transmission from another county. Id. at 563. The bulletin
described the two persons, the type of car they were driving, and the amount of money they had taken
in the robbery. Id. At the time of the arrest, the patrol officer himself had no warrant nor any basis
for a warrant to be issued. Id.
45. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971) (emphasis
added). See State v. Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600, 602 (N.D. 1992) (citing State v. Rodriguez, 454
N.W.2d 726, 729 (N.D. 1990)). See also State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 412,414 (N.D. 1989) (stating
that under the collective knowledge rule, the arresting officer was entitled to rely on information
transmitted to him by the police dispatcher).
46. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568. In support of this proposition, the Court stated that "[wie do not, of
course, question that the Laramie police were entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin." Id.
Continuing, the Court stated that "police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest
warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information
requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause." Id.
47. Id. at 568-69. United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411,416 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985) (emphasis added)).
48. 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985). In Hensley, a police officer, on the basis of an informant's tip
stating that Hensley [hereinafter respondent] had driven the getaway car in an armed robbery, issued
a wanted flyer for Hensley. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 223 (1985). The flyer stated that
the respondent was wanted for investigation of the robbery, gave a description of the respondent, the
date of the robbery, and the location of the robbery. Id. Subsequently, officers, acting on the basis of
the flyer, stopped an automobile that the respondent was seen driving. Id. at 224. The officers
arrested the passenger, a convicted felon, for being in possession of a handgun after spotting a
revolver protruding from underneath the passenger's seat. Id. at 224-25. After a search of the car
revealed other handguns, Respondent was also arrested and charged for being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm. Id. at 225. Respondent moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that
he was stopped without reasonable suspicion, violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. In a similar case,
an investigative stop was challenged on the premise of lack of reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.
United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411,416 (7th Cir. 1985). Relying on Hensley, the Longmire Court
found that "Whiteley's reasoning logically extends to the situation in which an officer effects a Terry
stop on the basis of a flyer indicating that another police department has a reasonable suspicion that an
individual was involved in a crime." Id. at 416.
49. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
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based on reasonable suspicion. 50 Hence, an investigating officer was
entitled to rely on a bulletin to establish reasonable suspicion. 51
50. Id. at 232. Prior to the Hensley decision, the rationale developed in Whiteley was applied to
Terry stops in United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976). In Robinson, the court
concluded that the officer relying on the bulletin was not required to possess personal knowledge of
the evidence creating a reasonable and articulable suspicion so long as the issuing officer could
establish a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop. Id. at 1300. The court reasoned that
officers acting on a radio bulletin could not be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers
regarding the evidentiary basis for the bulletin. Id. at 1299. The court further stated that effective law
enforcement was an impossibility unless police officers were entitled to act upon directives and
information communicated amongst them. Id. at 1300 n.l. See also State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d
726, 729 (N.D. 1990). Thus, even before the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Hensley, the
"legality of a stop pursuant to a bulletin or flyer turned on whether the issuing officer had the requisite
factual basis for the action." Longmire, 761 F.2d at 416. This reliance on knowledge of other officers
from Robinson was directly incorporated by the Court in Hensley. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 23 1. For a
summation of the remaining circuits which have applied the collective knowledge reasoning
developed in Whiteley and Hensley, see Court Review. supra note 21, at 879 n.1 12.
51. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232. For courts that have applied the Hensley holding to radio
dispatches, see: United States v. Cutchin, 956 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that 911
calls were admissible to show whether the dispatcher had a factual basis for alerting officers to the
defendant's car); United States v. Roach, 958 F.2d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that an officer's
stop at an individual who was carrying a sawed-off shotgun was valid); United States v. Thompson,
906 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838 (1990) (stating that an officer was
entitled to rely on information in a bulletin if the informant had reasonable suspicion to believe a crime
would be or had been committed); United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411,415-16 (7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that officers may rely on a bulletin without personal knowledge so long as the reliance is based
on reasonable suspicion); United States v. Mobley, 699 F.2d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 909 (1983) (holding that officers could search a car for other suspects when the bulletin stated
there were four suspects when only two were visible and two were hiding); United States v. Robinson,
536 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that reliance on a bulletin will not validate a stop if the
dispatcher did not have founded suspicion); Village of Gurnee v. Gross, 528 N.E.2d 411,413 (I1. App.
Ct. 1988) (determining that an officer's observation of a defendant's car which matched a complaint
coupled with defendant's refusal to pull over was sufficient to allow an investigatory stop); State v.
Bailey, 452 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Iowa 1990) (stating that an officer may rely on information from
another officer to make a stop only when the communication is based on reasonable suspicion);
Commonwealth v. Fraser, 573 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a radio bulletin was not
enough to permit a pat down, but when other factors such as the area defendant was in and the
defendant's actions, there was enough information to allow a pat down); Olson v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 555-56 (Minn. 1985) (holding that an anonymous tip warning of a
possible drunk driver lacks any indicia of reliability and may not be used to justify a stop); State v.
Holmes, 501 N.E.2d 629, 634-35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (determining that evidence was admissible
when obtained in a search after officers relied on a radio transmission from a fellow officer who had
personal knowledge of probable cause); State v. Black, 721 P.2d 842, 846 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (stating
that an anonymous tip lacks any indicia of reliability when it is not clear how the caller received her
information and the officer's observations did not corroborate the tip); State v. Moore, 775 S.W.2d 372,
377-78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that all surrounding circumstances must be reviewed to
determine probable cause, and when considered here, probable cause to search the vehicle existed
after learning of a burglary); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah 1989) (finding that
information from police officers which was issued by an all-channel police broadcast contained
enough "articulable facts" to support a "reasonable suspicion" that the defendant had robbed a store);
State v. McCord, 576 P.2d 892, 896 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that there must be some factual
basis for the communication between officers in order for the second to rely on the information and
the search to be legal); State v. Aden, 241 N.W.2d 669, 671 (1976) (reiterating that "[i]t is not only
the personal knowledge of the officer who makes the search and seizure which may be used to test
probable cause, but added thereto may be the collective knowledge of the law enforcement agency
for which the officer acts."). For cases allowing utilization of the "collective knowledge of all the
officers" rationale where there is no directive or request, See United States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1987) (stating that probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of all the
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The Hensley Court recognized that law enforcement interests
promoted by allowing one agency to rely on another agency's bulletins
considerably outweighed the minimal intrusion on personal security.5 2
When a bulletin is issued on the basis of reasonable and articulable facts
indicating possible criminal activity, the Court stated that "reliance on
that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose
questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting
to obtain further information."53
The Hensley Court continued, stating that in situations where the
investigating officer makes an investigatory stop in reliance on the
bulletin, the correct inquiry is whether the officer issuing the bulletin can
establish reasonable suspicion, not whether the arresting officer alone
can.5 4 In these cases, the investigating officer is entitled to rely upon the
information in possession of the police dispatcher, as well as his or her
own, to establish reasonable suspicion.55
officers involved because they were all in communication with each other) and Pyles v. State, 755
S.W.2d 98, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (stating that "it is the combination of the knowledge of the
arresting officer and other cooperating officers, the observation of the arresting officer, and the
factors that indicate the commission of a crime and an attempt to escape therefrom which constitute a
reasonable conclusion that there is probable cause to make an arrest without a warrant.").
52. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232.
53. Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, the Court in Adams v. Williams stated that "[a] brief stop of a
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while
obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at that
time." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
54. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added). The Hensley Court stated that "[a]ssuming the
police make a Terry stop in objective reliance on a flyer or bulletin, we [the Court] hold that the
evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin
possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop." Id. at 233. See also Longmire, 761 F.2d at 416.
55. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232.
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Some state courts have incorporated the federal court's collective
knowledge methodology into their own reasonable suspicion inquiries.56
For example, Colorado state courts utilize the "collective knowledge"
proposition to form the basis for their "fellow officer" test. 57 Under
this test, an arresting officer who does not have in his possession infor-
mation sufficient to establish probable cause may still effectuate an arrest
if the officer can demonstrate that he was acting upon the direction of, or
as a result of communications from, a fellow officer, and that the police
department, taken as a whole, was in possession of information sufficient
to constitute probable cause. 58
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, which has explicitly stated
that the information retained by the dispatching officer be considered in
establishing reasonable suspicion,5 9 the North Dakota Supreme Court has
not consistently applied the collective knowledge test in its review of
reasonable suspicion stops.60
56. See People v. Nanes, 483 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1971). For other state courts which have
employed the collective knowledge reasoning see: State v. Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn. 1984)
(stating that under the "collective knowledge" approach, the test is whether the pooled knowledge of
the entire police department is sufficient to establish probable cause), State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d
639, 642 n.l (Mo. 1992) (stating that the investigating officer was entitled to rely on the information
transmitted over the all-points bulletin as long as the originator of the radio bulletin had reasonable
suspicion to believe a crime would be or had been committed) (citing United States v. Thompson, 906
F.2d 1292, 1296 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied. 498 U.S. 838 (1990)): Village of Gurnee v. Gross,
528 N.E.2d 411, 413 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that a police officer may rely on information
received through police communication channels, including radio messages, to justify an investigatory
stop; the collective knowledge of the law enforcement agency requesting or directing such action must
be viewed to determine whether sufficient facts existed warranting a stop); State v. Black, 721 P.2d
842, 846 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the appropriate inquiry is whether the information possessed
collectively by the trooper and the dispatcher gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant
had committed a crime); State v. Wille, 518 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1994) (finding that "[a]n officer's
belief may be partially predicated on hearsay information, and the officer may rely on the collective
knowledge of the officer's entire department) (citing State v. Cheers, 306 N.W.2d 676, 684-86 (Wisc.
1981)); People v. Conway, 222 Cal. App. 3d 806, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "[an officer
may reasonably rely on information received through official channels); In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d 1123,
1131 (D.C. 1993) (finding that "Hensley holds that the validity of a Terry stop in the field, which is
based on a broadcast, lookout, flyer, or bulletin, and which is effected by an officer who knows
nothing about the underlying facts that prompted the communication, depends upon the adequacy of
the information available to the entity responsible for the communication").
57. People v. Nanes, 483 P.2d 958,962 (Colo. 1971). In Nanes, a police officer was informed by
a motorist who had heard a radio broadcast that a robbery had just taken place. Id. at 960. The
officer confirmed the report with police dispatch and stopped the vehicle allegedly used in the robbery
and arrested the occupants without first obtaining a warrant. Id. The defendants moved to suppress
the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court stated that the officer
had a lawful right to stop the vehicle and make a threshold investigation on the basis of the information
given by the citizen informant. Id. at 961.
58. Id. at 962.
59. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1984) (citing to United States v. Robinson,
536 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1976), for the proposition that the officer who issues the bulletin must
have a reasonable suspicion to justify a stop).
60. See State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638,643 (N.D. 1994) (refusing to impute information held by
dispatcher to investigating officer for purposes of reasonable suspicion analysis); State v. Neis, 469
N.W.2d 568, 569 (N.D. 1991) (stating that information contained in the anonymous tip combined with
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Attempts by the North Dakota Supreme Court to delineate the
extent of usable sources of information has varied thereby causing
uncertainty in reasonable suspicion analysis. In cases involving investi-
gatory stops initiated as the result of an informant's tip, the court has
generally analyzed the stop in one of two ways, depending on whether
the identity of the informant is known or remains anonymous. 61 Ac-
cording to the court, when the informant is unknown to the police, the
informant's reliability and trustworthiness are diminished. 62 As a result,
the court requires corroboration of the information from the tip, as well
as officer verification of "something more" to indicate criminal activi-
ty.63 Therefore, the court has stated that an anonymous tip, together with
the officer's own observations of suspicious conduct, is sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion.64
However, problems arise when the identity of the informant, al-
though known by the dispatcher, is not transmitted or made known to
the investigating officer. In previous reasonable suspicion inquiries
where the identity of the informant was not known by the investigating
officer, the North Dakota Supreme Court has employed a multitude of
different methods to establish the reliability of the information contained
in the tip.65
For example, the court has previously relied on the collective knowl-
edge premise held by officers other than the investigating officer to
officers observations amounted to reasonable suspicion); State v. Bryl, 477 N.W.2d 814, 817 (N.D.
1991) (stating that although the investigating officer did not know the identity of the informant, the
informant was "identified" and the tip displayed indicia of reliability); State v. Hornaday, 477 N.W.2d
245, 246 (N.D. 1991) (determining that information received from another officer via police radio in
combination with the arresting officer's observations amounted to reasonable suspicion).
61. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 640-41.
62. Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329, 332-33 (N.D. 1987)
(concluding that information supplied by unidentified informant coupled with officer corroboration
was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion).
63. State v. Guthmiller, 499 N.W.2d 590, 592 (N.D. 1993) (stating that motorist's hesitation at
stop sign combined with anonymous tip was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion).
64. State v. Lange, 255 N.W.2d 59, 63 (N.D. 1977) (indicating that the investigating officer was
justified in making stop based on anonymous tip transmitted by fellow officer combined with his or her
own observations).
65. See Bryl v. Backes, 477 N.W.2d 809, 812 (N.D. 1991) (accepting the investigating officer's
assumption as to the identity of the informant as sufficient to classify the informant as known); State v.
Neis, 469 N.W.2d 568, 569 (N.D. 1991) (using a police dispatcher's retention of the informant's
identity to establish the reliability of the information provided by the informant); accord State v. Bryl,
477 N.W.2d 814, 817 (N.D. 1991) (allowing the quick response time by the investigating officer to
establish the reliability of the informant); State v. Hornaday, 477 N.W.2d 245, 246 (N.D. 1991)
(allowing an investigating officer to rely on information supplied by another officer to establish
reasonable suspicion); State v. Lange, 255 N.W.2d 59, 63 (N.D. 1977) (allowing investigating officer
to rely on information provided by fellow officer combined with independent observations to establish
reasonable suspicion).
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satisfy reasonable suspicion.66 In State v. Mische,67 the court explicitly
recognized the existence of the collective knowledge rule, which allows
an arresting officer to rely on information transmitted to that officer by
a dispatcher to establish reasonable suspicion to uphold an investigatory
stop .68
Further, in its review of two subsequent reasonable suspicion stops,
the court specifically allowed the identity of the informant, retained by
the dispatcher but not relayed to the investigating officer, to be used to
establish the reliability of the information contained in the tip.69 More
recently, in State v. Nelson 70 the court employed the collective knowl-
edge premise advanced by the United States Supreme Court in reversing
a motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a reasonable
suspicion stop.7 l
66. State v. Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600, 603-04 (N.D. 1992) (utilizing collective knowledge
premise advanced by United States Supreme Court in a reasonable suspicion analysis); accord State v.
Rodriquez, 454 N.W.2d 726, 729 (N.D. 1990) (endorsing reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court advanced in Hensley to uphold reasonable suspicion stop). State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 412.
414 (N.D. 1989) (recognizing explicitly the existence of a "collective knowledge" rule which allows
an arresting officer to rely on information transmitted to him by a dispatcher).
67. 448 N.W.2d 412 (N.D. 1989).
68. State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 412,414 (N.D. 1989).
69. State v. Neis, 469 N.W.2d 568 (N.D. 1991). In Neis, the court ruled that a tip from an in-
formant who identified herself to the dispatcher, and had described the vehicle and the apparent
criminal activity displayed adequate indicia of reliability to justify the stop. Id. at 569. This finding
was made despite the fact that the dispatcher's report did not list the name of the informant, nor was
the informant's identity relayed to the investigating officer; yet the court still found the information
sufficiently reliable to uphold the stop upon officer corroboration. Id. In Bryl v. Backes, 477 N.W.2d
809 (N.D. 1991), the court found that the information given to the police dispatcher by the informant
was sufficiently reliable. Id. at 813. The Backes court allowed the investigating officer to assume the
identity of the informant even though he was never actually informed of her identity. Id. at 812. The
informant in Backes provided less vehicle-specific information than the informant in Miller, yet the
court found this information sufficient. Compare State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 639 (N.D. 1994)
(describing the vehicle as a red pickup and relaying the license number) with Backes, 477 N.W.2d at
812 (describing the vehicle as a pickup in the parking lot). The finding of the court was attributed to
the quick reaction time to the bulletin by the investigating officer. Id. The court noted that:
[I1n this case, the inquiry into whether or not there was any basis for identifying possible
criminal activity, in a sense, parallels the inquiry into whether or not Officer Fix's
suspicions were sufficiently particularized. Giving the short lapse of time between the tip
and Officer Fix's arrival at the store, and the fact that there were only two vehicles in
the parking lot, one of which Officer Fix recognized as belonging to the store attendant,
the reasonable suspicions aroused were particularized to the one vehicle.
Id. at 812 n.3 (emphasis added).
70. 488 N.W.2d 600 (N.D. 1992).
71. State v. Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600,603-04 (N.D. 1992). In Nelson, the stop at issue came as
the result of information being relayed by one officer to another. Id. at 601. Justice Meschke, writing
for the majority, cited Whiteley and Hensley extensively in upholding the stop by allowing the
investigating officer to rely on the information transmitted to him by the other officer. Id. at 603-04.
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III. ANALYSIS
In decisions prior to Miller, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
stated that an investigating officer need not have an absolute suspicion
that a law has been violated prior to initiating a stop. 7 2 Requiring an
absolute suspicion would defeat the purpose of the "reasonable and
articulable suspicion" standard. 7 3
However, in Miller, the court explained that, in the absence of
suspicious behavior indicating possible criminal activity, the basis for the
stop must rest on the reliability of the information contained in the tip
itself.74 To determine the reliability of the tip in Miller, the court differ-
entiated between tips by face-to-face informants and those by anony-
mous informants. 7 5 In the instant case, the informant could only be
considered known if knowledge of the informant's identity could be
imputed to the investigating officer. 76 The court was unable to find
support allowing the imputation of this information, and, as a result, the
reliability of the tip was diminished. 77 Therefore, in the absence of some
indication of criminal activity, the information possessed by Officer
Chase was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, according to the
court. 7
8
In Miller, the court stated that when evaluating the factual basis for a
stop, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into account when
the sufficiency of cause surrounding the stop is appraised. 79 This
72. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726, 729 n.2 (N.D. 1990) (finding that to require an
investigating officer to confirm an outstanding warrant would be to require "law enforcement officers
to have an 'absolute' suspicion that a person had violated the law, as opposed to a 'reasonable and
articulable' suspicion"); Olson v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985)
(finding that not much is required to initiate a traffic stop for a suspected traffic offense then in
progress; "[a]ll that is required is that the stop not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle
curiosity" (citations omitted)). In another recent case, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:
[law enforcement officers are not] required to point to a single factor which, standing
alone, signals a potential violation of the law. Rather, officers are to assess the situation
as it unforlds and, based on inferences and deductions drawn from their experience and
training, make the determination whether all of the circumstances viewed together
create a reasonable suspicion of potential criminal activity.
Geiger v. Backes, 444 N.W.2d 692, 693 (N.D. 1989) (emphasis added).
73. Cf. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d at 729 n.1 & n.2 (distinguishing between reasonable suspicion and
probable cause stops).
74. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640 (N.D. 1994).
75. Id. at 640-41.
76. Id. at 642.
77. Id. at 644-45.
78. Id. at 645.
79. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 640. See Geiger v. Backes. 444 N.W.2d 692,693 (N.D. 1989) (stating
that when making a determination of whether there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
courts must consider all circumstances viewed together). See also State v. Neis. 469 N.W.2d 568, 571
(N.D. 1991) (stating that under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court could find that the
investigating officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle). Accord United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). In discarding the rigid Aguilar-Spinelli reasonable
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objective standard purports to weigh the Fourth Amendment rights of
the accused against the state's interest in investigating the tip in light of
all circumstances surrounding the stop.80 As part of this evaluation, the
"quantity, or content, and quality, or degree of reliability, of the infor-
mation available to the officer" is taken into consideration. 8' Then,
based upon the entire picture, the investigating officer must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual of crimi-
nal activity.82
An objective reading of the flyer or bulletin dictates whether other
police officers can justifiably rely on them in making an investigative
suspicion analysis, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is
sufficient to authorize police to stop a person. Terms like "articulable reasons" and
"founded suspicion" are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance
dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been
written is that the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into
account. Based upon that whole'picture the detaining officers must have a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized
suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is
permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all of the circumstances. The
analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if
such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain
kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes
deductions-inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long
before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated
certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are
permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but
as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.
The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture
must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described must
raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.
Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983) (abandoning the
"two-pronged test" developed in Aguilar and Spinelli in favor of the "totality of the circumstances"
method of analysis).
80. State v. Bryl, 477 N.W.2d 814, 816-17 (N.D. 1991) (citing Wibben v. North Dakota State
Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329, 332 (N.D. 1987)).
81. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 640. When an informant is shown to be correct about certain aspects
of the tip, he is probably correct about other allegations, including the claim of criminal activity.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,427 (1969)).
82. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 640. Accord Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663 (1979)
(holding that articulable and reasonable suspicion of an offense must exist for an officer to stop a
motorist); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (stating that an informant known to the
arresting officer makes the information more reliable). Case law in this area regarding the propriety
of an investigative stop largely defers to the judgment of the law enforcement officer. Timothy L.
Moll, Note, Drunk Drivers Beware! Nebraska Adopts Administrative License Revocation, 72 NEB. L.
REV. 296, 312 (1993). Indeed, one court was of the opinion that "the legality of a stop must be judged
by the objective facts known to the seizing officers rather than by the justifications articulated by
them.' Court Review, supra note 21, at 887, n.109 (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210,
213 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987) (determining that an officer's observations of
the suspect entering and leaving a house suspected to be a distribution center several times late at night
established reasonable suspicion)).
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stop. 83 The governmental interest which allegedly justifies the officer's
intrusion is the key focal point in making this determination. 84 Further,
this objective assessment takes into account all observations and
circumstances available to the investigating officer, including informa-
tion contained in police reports.85 Finally, from this assessment, the
trained officer is entitled to draw inferences and deductions which may
elude the normal citizen,86 which are then taken into account and used to
establish the basis for reasonable suspicion. 87
Applying this objective analysis, the court opined that since the
identity of the informant was unknown to Officer Chase, the information
was insufficient by itself to establish reasonable suspicion. 88 The court
distinguished Miller from Whiteley and Hensley by emphasizing that
Officer Chase was not relying on the knowledge of a directing officer,
but rather on the knowledge of a fellow officer. 89 According to the
court, while knowledge of a directing officer 90 could be imputed to an
investigating officer via a directive, knowledge of another officer could
not.9 1 The court explained that had a directing officer issued the bulle-
tin, Officer Chase would have been entitled to assume that the officer
issuing the directive had, or could establish, a reasonable and articulable
suspicion. 92 The court stated that in the absence of such a directive,
83. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 646 (Meschke, J., dissenting) (quoting from United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985)).
84. Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968).
85. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981).
86. Id. It is worth noting that Officer Chase had received advanced training in DUI detection
and apprehension prior to this stop. Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 5, State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d
638 (N.D. 1994) (No. 930206). See also Court Review, supra note 21, at 860, 879-80 (stating that
courts generally give considerable deference to the observations and conclusions of a trained officer).
87. Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329, 332 (N.D. 1987). See
also State v. Neis, 469 N.W.2d 568, 469 (N.D. 1991) (stating that "[t]he question is whether or not a
reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to
suspect ... criminal activity" (quoting State v. Indvik, 382 N.W.2d 623,627 (N.D. 1986)). The United
States Supreme Court has cautioned that "[a] court making [the] assessment should take care to
consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court
should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,686 (1985).
88. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 645.
89. Id. at 643.
90. Id. (emphasis added). As explained by the Miller court, a directing officer is any officer that
issues a directive, command, or order to stop a vehicle or one who assumes responsibility for
establishing reasonable suspicion. Id. This classification of officer is distinguished from the officer
who simply relays information to the investigating officer, thereby leaving it to the investigating officer
to establish reasonable suspicion. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. One commentator has recently suggested that probable cause has an "independent
existence." Moll, supra note 82, at 315. The author states that the validity of an arrest is premised on
the existence of probable cause, not on the investigating officer's knowledge that probable cause
existed. Id. (citing State v. Sassen, 484 N.W.2d 469 (1992)) (emphasis added). An approach such as
this insinuates that the court has the ability to "find" probable cause in situations when the officer did
not have sufficient knowledge himself. Id. This postulate was extended to a reasonable suspicion
analysis in United States v. Hawkins. 811 F.2d 210, 212-14 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833
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however, any information known by an officer other than a directing
officer could not be imputed to the investigating officer. 93 The court
reasoned that such circumstances would allow the investigating officer to
initiate the stop in hope that he could later justify his actions through the
knowledge of other officers, regardless of whether the officer personally
had a reasonable and articulable suspicion. 94
The court found the collective knowledge proposition set forth in
Whiteley and Hensley to be distinguishable and therefore inapplicable to
the present case.95 According to the Miller court, a police officer could
rely on the untransmitted knowledge or information held by another
officer only in those situations where the officers were participating in an
ongoing investigation. 96 However, in situations involving multiple
officers who are not participating in an ongoing investigation, the Miller
court refused to allow another officer's knowledge that was not commu-
nicated to the investigating officer, to be imputed to the investigating
officer.9 7 Since neither the stop in Hensley or Whiteley came as the
result of an ongoing investigation, the court reasoned that the collective
knowledge theory developed in those cases did not apply in the present
case.98
However, on previous occasion, the court has stated that "law
enforcement officers must be allowed to rely upon information received
from other officers." 99 Further, the court has also found that justifica-
tion for an investigatory stop can be made by the department, as a whole,
by issuing the flyer or bulletin, regardless of whether the investigating
(1987). See also, Court Review, supra note 21, at 879 n. 112 (providing citations to United States
Supreme Court and United States Courts of Appeal cases which have addressed collective knowledge
and the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion standard).
93. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 643.
94. Id. The court reiterated this belief by summarizing from one noted authority: " Whiteley must
in turn be distinguished from the case in which there has been no directive or request but the arresting
or searching officer attempts to justify his action on the ground that other officers were at that time in
possession of the necessary underlying facts." Id. (quoting I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3(e), at 208 (1984) [hereinafter LAFAVE] (quoting State v. Mickelson, 526
P.2d 583, 584 (Or. 1974)).
95. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 644.
96. See id. at 643 (noting that the knowledge of officers has been imputed in the absence of a
directive when officers were working together) (citing United States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1048 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 643. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 223 (1985) (stating that arresting
officer received information via "wanted flyer"); Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary,
401 U.S. 560,563 (1971) (stating that arresting officer received information via police radio).
99. State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726, 729 n.2 (N.D. 1990).
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officer could justify the stop acting individually.100 In Miller, however,
the court refused to allow Officer Chase to rely on the officer issuing the
bulletin to establish reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.101
The Miller dissent stated that the collective knowledge of the law
enforcement entity, as a whole, should be taken into account when
determining the reasonableness of a stop under the Fourth Amend-
ment.102 Therefore, the admissibility of evidence against Miller depends
on whether the dispatcher had knowledge of specific and articulable
facts sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that Miller was indeed
violating section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code.103
Accordingly, if the dispatcher himself had the requisite basis to establish
reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop, he could then
delegate that authority to Officer Chase.104
Police officers called upon to investigate a possible drunk driver are
allowed to rely on the collective information of the dispatcher in addi-
tion to their own observations and deductions in making an investigatory
stop. 105 While the tip must provide some indicia of reliability by which
the honesty of the informant can be measured, 106 the information
necessary to establish reasonable suspicion can be less reliable than that
necessary to establish probable cause. 107
100. State v. Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600, 603 (N.D. 1992). In Nelson, the court stated that
"Hensley teaches us that the reason for a stop can be based on information communicated by a fellow
officer," with no distinction being made as to who the officer relaying the information is. Id. at 604.
See also United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411,416 (7th Cir. 1985) (determining that the validity of
the reasonable suspicion depends upon the knowledge of the issuing officer).
101. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 643. See CHARLE WHrrEBREAD CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 9.03(2) (2d ed. 1986) (stating that sources of information other than the direct knowledge
of the investigating officer can form the basis for articulable and reasonable suspicion; police are
entitled to rely on notices and flyers from other jurisdictions in making investigatory stops).
102. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 646 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
103. Olson v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1985) (a citizen
informant reported a "possible drunk driver", described the vehicle, license plate number, and vehicle
location, but the investigating officer observed no erratic driving; thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court
found that the tip lacked the requisite indicia of reliability required by a Fourth Amendment
investigative stop). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (1987 & Supp. 1993). Accord United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,233 (1985); United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411,416 (7th Cir. 1985).
104. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 233. See United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir.
1976) (stating that "[i]f the dispatcher himself had had founded suspicion, or if he had relied on
information from a reliable informant who supplied him with adequate facts to establish founded
suspicion," then the dispatcher could delegate the stopping function to the investigating officer).
105. State v. Lykken, 406 N.W.2d 664,666 (N.D. 1987).
106. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D. 1985) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983)). The Miller court did acknowledge that telephone tips from named callers were more reliable
than their anonymous counterparts, thereby reducing the amount of information required to raise
reasonable suspicion. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 642 (emphasis added). See also id. at 648 (Meschke, J.,
dissenting) (stating in dissent that "[i]n my view, the majority opinion discounts the report of an
identified [citizen] informant too much") (emphasis added).
107. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
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At least one other state's supreme court has maintained that when
an informant is apparently a reliable citizen, the court is entitled to
presume the reliability of the informant and the information provided.108
The informant's reliability is further fortified when he or she reveals his
or her identity to the police. 109 If the caller is truthful in identifying
himself or herself to the police, then the information given by that
informant has provided the police a means to locate the caller and hold
him or her accountable should the information be false.llO
In accord with this assertion, the United States Supreme Court
mandated that rigorous scrutiny of the basis of the informant's knowl-
edge is unnecessary when the informant has provided his or her identity
because he or she has subjected himself or herself to criminal liability if
the report was fabricated. I'' In Miller, the police dispatcher knew the
identity of the informant and his place of employment thereby establish-
ing a traceable path should the information prove inaccurate or un-
founded.112
Despite the omission of the word "imputation," cases similar to the
present case have consistently allowed the investigating officer to rely on
the collective knowledge of police dispatch to establish a reasonable and
articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop.11 3 Prior to Miller, the
North Dakota Supreme Court stated that simply because the officer
acting on the informant's tip does not know the identity of the infor-
mant, it does not make the information of little or no value.114 Nonethe-
108. Marben v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980) (using the
presumed reliability of a citizen informant to uphold an investigatory stop based on an articulable and
reasonable suspicion).
109. Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn. 1988).
110. Id. Continuing, the Shepard court stated that "at least for the purpose of making a limited
investigatory stop, the officer was justified in assuming that the caller was being truthful in so
describing himself." Id. (footnote omitted).
111. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,233-34 (1983).
112. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638,639 (N.D. 1994).
113. See Bryl v. Backes, 477 N.W.2d 809, 812 (N.D. 1991). In Backes, a bulletin issued
described the vehicle and behavior of the driver, but did not include the vehicle's color or license
plate number. Id. at 810. The identity of informant was unknown to investigating officer, however,
the court upheld the stop due to the officer's assumption of identity of informant and the short lapse of
time between bulletin and the officer's arrival. Id. at 812. See State v. Neis, 469 N.W.2d 568, 569-70
(N.D. 1991) (determining stop valid because informant identified herself to dispatcher, the vehicle and
the behavior of the driver although the identity of informant unknown to investigating officer);
Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.w.2d 329, 330 (N.D. 1987) (determining stop
valid because the investigating officer was able to verify information contained in tip although
informant was unidentified). Cf. United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1299-1301 (9th Cir. 1976)
(determining that the dispatcher did not have a reasonable suspicion, and because the arresting officer
did not have additional suspicions, the stop was illegal).
114. Neis, 469 N.W. 2d at 570. In Neis, the court stated that the information provided by the
informant: the color of the pickup, license number, location, and description of the driver's erratic
driving, and her name, was more than conclusory. Id. Further, "[t]he fact that the officer making the
stop did not know who she was does not make the tip worthless." Id. See also State v. Guthmiller, 499
N.W.2d 590, 592 (N.D. 1993) (citing to Neis for the proposition that a tip is not worthless even if the
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less, the Miller court refused to allow the dispatcher's knowledge of the
informant's identity to be considered in satisfying the reasonable
suspicion inquiry.115
A court reviewing a reasonable suspicion stop must not look to
whether particular conduct is "guilty" or "innocent," but instead to the
degree of suspicion that attaches to the conduct at issue. 116 Justice
Meschke, in his dissent, stated that the focus of the court in this instance
was misplaced.11 7 According to Justice Meschke, the majority in Miller
placed undue importance on the categorization of the informant as
either identified or anonymous in determining the reliability of the
information.l18 Justice Meschke, referring to the court's reasoning in
State v. Bryl,1 9 found that "although sketchy, the composite of the
information that the officer had gave him reasonable cause" to suspect
the vehicle contained an impaired driver and to initiate the stop.120
Further, Justice Meschke, quoting with approval from State v.
Nelson,121 stated that "[plolice may briefly stop an auto to investigate a
reasonable suspicion that a driver may be violating a law, without waiting
for an actual violation or an actual injury to someone." 122 According to
Justice Meschke, the information relied upon by the investigating officer
need not come from personal observation alone, but may come from
another officer. 123
Justice Meschke argued that the majority opinion "discounts the
report of an identified informant too much, and attenuates brief commu-
tipper's identity is not known to the arresting officer).
115. Miller, 510 N.W. 2d at 645.
116. Olson v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1985) (quoting from
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983)). In his testimony, Officer Chase stated that he
believed that Miller pulled back into the parking lot as a result of seeing the police car pull in behind
him, causing seemingly innocent activity to become suspicious in the opinion of the investigating
officer. Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 12, State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994) (No.
930206). The United States Supreme Court has resolved that innocent behavior will often provide the
basis for a showing of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13. This premise is equally applicable
in a reasonable suspicion analysis. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). Further, several
innocent activities separately may amount to reasonable suspicion when viewed collectively. Id.
Therefore, Officer Chase's verification of the information contained in the tip, and, more importantly,
his independent assessment of the situation, including Miller's behavior, are central elements to the
reasonable suspicion inquiry. Backes, 477 N.W.2d at 816.
117. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 648 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Meschke, J., dissenting). Justice Meschke, in his dissent, opined that the informant was
not anonymous, but instead identified. Id. at 647. Further, Justice Meschke stated that the information
included in the tip was more than conclusory and provided sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the
stop. Id. at 648.
119. 477 N.W.2d 814 (N.D. 1991).
120. State v. Bryl, 477 N.W.2d 814 (N.D. 1991); Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 645 (Meschke, J.,
dissenting).
121. 488 N.W.2d 600 (N.D. 1992).
122. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 645-46 (Meschke. J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Nelson, 488
N.W.2d 608,602-04 (N.D. 1992) (citation omitted)).
123. Id. at 646 (Meschke, J., dissenting) (citing Nelson, 488 N.W.2d at 602-04 (citation omitted)).
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nications between law enforcement officers," more so than previous
decisions by the court. 124 Furthermore, Justice Meschke stated that the
collective knowledge of the law enforcement entity, as a whole, must be
taken into account when determining the reasonableness of a stop under
the Fourth Amendment.125 For this reason, Justice Meschke declined to
agree with the majority's view that the informant's tip was anonymous
or unreliable.1 26 In conclusion, Justice Meschke stated that Officer
Chase, acting on the dispatch bulletin and his own verification of that
information, satisfied this reasonable suspicion standard.127
IV. IMPACT
The North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Miller may affect
the ability of police officers to initiate an investigative stop on the basis
of a radio dispatch. In addition, this decision may also hamper law
enforcement efforts to effectively prevent drunk driving. No longer will
the investigating officer be allowed to rely on his or her fellow officer to
establish reasonable suspicion. Rather, the arresting officer must now
sustain a reasonable suspicion inquiry based solely on the information in
his or her possession, rather than the collective knowledge of all officers
involved.
As a result, to withstand a reasonable suspicion inquiry in the future,
radio dispatchers will now have to make sure that the name of the
informant, or some indication thereof, is communicated to the investigat-
ing officer in order to establish the reliability of the informant and the
information contained in the tip. Otherwise, if the identity of the infor-
124. Id. at 648 (Meschke, J., dissenting). See State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726, 729 n.2 (N.D.
1990) (stating that "law enforcement officers must be allowed to rely upon information received from
other officers").
125. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 648. (citing Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d. at 729). See also United States
v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985) (finding that the admissibility of evidence turns on whether the
officer who issued the flyer possessed reasonable suspicion to justify the stop); United States v.
Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that although the officer who issues the bulletin
must have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop, the officer acting in reliance on the
bulletin need not have personal knowledge sufficient to satisfy the inquiry); Nelson, 488 N.W.2d at 602
(stating that "the collective information of law enforcement personnel, known by or transmitted to the
stopping officer, must be considered to assess whether a stop is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Bryl v. Backes, 477 N.W.2d 809, 812 (N.D. 1991)
(allowing the investigating officer to assume the identity of the informant retained by the dispatcher);
State v. Neis, 469 N.w.2d 568, 569-70 (N.D. 1991) (utilizing knowledge retained by the dispatcher in
a reasonable suspicion analysis); Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329,
332 (N.D. 1987) (stating that independent verification of information contained in an anonymous tip
was sufficient to satisfy reasonable suspicion inquiry). See, e.g., United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 898
F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that "the determination of 'reasonable suspicion' involves the
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the collective knowledge of all the officers
in assessing the facts") (citation omitted).
126. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 647 (Meschke. J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 648 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
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mant is not communicated, the tip will be classified as anonymous and
the reliability of the tip will automatically diminish regardless of whether
the identity of the informant is known to the law enforcement agency.
Further, discrediting information provided by a known informant may
discourage active participation and intervention by the public in appre-
hending intoxicated drivers, something that is crucial to effective en-
forcement of DUI laws in North Dakota. 128
The concept of reasonable suspicion, in the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court, is not "readily, or even, usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules."129 Not every potential stop is the same and
"one simple rule will not cover every situation." 130  However, the Court
realized that when a bulletin is issued on the basis of reasonable and
articulable facts, the investigating officer is justified in making the
stop.131 This statement indicates that the stop can be based on the
notifying officer's knowledge with no requirement imposed on the
investigating officer to maintain a separate basis for the stop, so long as
the dispatcher himself could sustain the burden. 132 What effect and
weight is given to this "collective knowledge" proposition by the North
Dakota Supreme Court is uncertain since the Miller court severely
restricted its application.133
128. Cf. United States v McBride, 801 F.2d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, McBride v.
United States, 479 U.S. 1100 (1987) (discussing the reliability of anonymous citizen tips). In McBride,
the court "recognized that the choice for police is between making limited investigatory stops and
ignoring citizen tips." Id.
129. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232
(1983)).
130. Olson v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552,554 (Minn. 1985) (quoting Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)). One author summarized the problem as follows: "The task is
to promulgate a set of rules which will be flexible enough to cope with the enormous variation in
police-citizen encounters but which, at the same time, can be easily applied by police." Terence C.
Gill, Note, Regulating the Police in Investigatory Stops: A Practical Alternative to Bright Line Rules, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 183. 184-85 (1985) (providing an overview of issues to consider in determining how to
regulate investigating officers undertaking reasonable suspicion stops and the subsequent evidentiary
suppression problems relative to the stop). For an informative discussion of alternate approaches to
such a scheme see Albert Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITr. L.
REV. 227 (1984).
131. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985) (emphasis added). Interestingly, when
the issuing officer is only relaying information from an informant, the only verification that can be
done is by the officer in the field. However, the United States Supreme Court stated that if the officer
issuing the bulletin had knowledge of information sufficient to form a reasonable suspicion, then the
stop was valid, without the relaying officer ever actually verifying the information himself. Id.
132. E.g., id. at 231 (stating that the admissibility of evidence turns on whether the officer issuing
the bulletin had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop); United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d
1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that the investigating officer need not have a reasonable suspicion
so long as the officer issuing the bulletin could satisfy the inquiry); United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d
411, 416 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that the relevant inquiry is whether the officer issuing the bulletin
could establish reasonable suspicion).
133. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 648 ( N.D. 1994) (Meschke, J., dissenting).
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As previously stated, Colorado courts have reduced the collective
knowledge proposition into a bright line test used to enumerate the
sources available to establish probable cause. 134 While a bright line
standard such as the one set forth by the Colorado Supreme Court in the
"fellow officer" test may seem unduly mechanical, it might help supply
the much needed consistency in instances when reasonable suspicion is
based, at least in part, on the knowledge of an officer other than the one
making the stop. 135 By enacting such a standard, the officer in the field
is not called on to perform a balancing test for every potential stop.136
In Miller, the North Dakota Supreme Court expressed a concern for
police initiating an investigatory stop with the hopes of later being able
to establish reasonable suspicion.137 However, under circumstances such
as these, the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual are already
protected because should the officers involved fail to establish reason-
able suspicion prior to making the stop, the evidence seized as a result of
the stop would be suppressed.138
An intoxicated person behind the wheel of a moving automobile
presents a serious threat to the safety and well-being of the general
public.139 Given the strong concern for public safety which prompted
the enactment of section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, it
is imperative that police efforts to properly enforce the law not be
hampered.140 Section 39-08-01 was intended to enable law enforcement
134. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text for discussion of the Colorado test.
135. One commentator has proffered two areas of concern for such a bright-line test. Alschuler,
supra note 131, at 227. First, by establishing a specific rule for every police-citizen confrontation,
inevitably so many rules will result that the police will not be able to effectively employ them in
practice. Id. at 231. Second, while a rigid rule such as this is easy to apply, the resulting injustice in
those situations which do not conform to the rule outweighs the gain in efficiency. See id.
136. Gill, supra note 130, at 186-87. The criteria used to determine the validity of an
investigatory stop is two-fold. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). First, the type and level of
information upon which the officer justifies the detention must be evaluated. Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 146 (1972). Second, the extent and intrusiveness of the limited search is considered. Id.
Generally, when an officer stops a citizen, "the propriety of the officer's actions is measured by the
degree to which they impair the personal security and dignity of the suspect." Gill, supra note 130, at
185-86 (footnotes omitted). Factors to consider include the "duration of the stop, the reason for the
stop .. .. the extent of movement of the suspect, and the amount of force displayed and threatened by
the police." Id. at 186. These factors are offset by such considerations as the "time of day, the nature
of the suspected crime, and the physical appearance and reactions of the suspect." Id. These factors
are balanced to determine the reasonableness of the officer's actions. Id.
137. See Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 649-40 (noting that reasonable suspicion must be established at
the time of the arrest).
138. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
139. Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329, 333 (N.D. 1987)
(quoting Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975)). The state has a significant
interest in determining the condition of the driver without unnecessary delay, thereby preventing
escape or further injury. Id.
140. See State v. Lange, 255 N.W.2d 59, 63 (N.D. 1977) (stating that when an officer has been
alerted to a possible drunk driver, that officer should not have to wait until there has been an accident
or obvious traffic violation prior to initiating an investigatory stop). In addition, the Wibben court
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officers to apprehend the drunk driver before he or she strikes. 141
Consistent application of the collective knowledge methodology will
help achieve this end.
James R. Salisbury142
determined that "[plolice must be permitted to act before their reasonable belief is verified by escape
or fruition of the harm it was their duty to prevent." Wibben, 413 N.W.2d at 332 (quoting LAFAVE,
supra note 67, § 3.8 (citing United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1975))).
141. Wibben, 413 N.W.2d at 333 (quoting Hughes, 535 P.2d at 1024). See N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-08-01 (1987& Supp. 1993).
142 Special thanks to my wife, Jennifer. for her endless support and patience, and to my parents.
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